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LEAD LENDER FAILURE AND THE
PITFALLS FOR THE UNWITTING
PARTICIPANT
by Lori Laughlin Dalton
N 1975 a mere 14 banks in the United States failed, compared with 120
bank failures ten years later. The number shot up again in 1987, with
184 bank failures, and in 1988, 200 banks failed.' More alarming is that
113 of the 200 are Texas banks.2 Bank failures on such a grandiose scale
clearly cause widespread hardship and uncertainties. To be sure, increased
consumer doubts exist. In addition, lenders using loan participation agree-
ments have growing doubts about their contractual relationships with other
banks.3
A by-product of the prevalent number of bank failures is the recognition
of legal issues that previously went unquestioned. 4 While the issues sur-
rounding participation agreements have been discussed before, the partici-
pant's commercial expectations continue to be disappointed because of an
increasing number of statutory and judicial ambiguities5 coupled with poor
draftsmanship. As participants become aware of previously unforeseen dan-
gers, they will require higher compensation for taking the risks they face in
the event the lead bank is declared insolvent. Alternatively, banks will cease
to engage in the participation transaction all together. Is one reaction more
favorable than the other? Certainly not. Both will be to the detriment of the
public in the long run, as the sources of funds will diminish while the cost of
funds will increase.
The purpose of this Comment is threefold. First, the Comment assesses
the present state of the law surrounding participations. Second, it points out
the hidden dangers in participation agreements that usually come to light
I. Telephone interview with Rick Salmon, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Nov.
3, 1988, and June 26, 1989).
2. Id.
3. For a full definition and discussion of the participation agreement, see infra text ac-
companying notes 6-30.
4. See, e.g., In re Continental Resources Corp., 43 Bankr. 658 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting future advances clause in agreement between lead lender and borrower and appli-
cation of such to participant); Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984)
(characterizing participant arrangement and borrower's right to offset in relation to partici-
pant); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (looking at
relationship and requisite standard of care between lead lender and participant).
5. For an example and discussion of such judicial ambiguity, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 40-117, discussing classification of the participant arrangement, and notes 144-54,
discussing the participant's rights against the FDIC.
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after lead lender failure. Third, it proposes changes at both common law
and statutory levels. Section I of the Comment outlines the nature of the
participation agreement. Section II discusses the various classifications of
participation transactions. Section III presents the consequences of lead
lender failure as discussed in the context of the respective classifications.
And finally, Section IV presents proposed changes in the law as well as a
model participation agreement.
I. PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS: THE PRACTICE AND PURPOSE
A loan participation is an agreement utilized when "two or more banks
join a loan with each bank lending a portion of the amount to the bor-
rower." 6 The banks formally share the loan through the use of a participa-
tion agreement. 7 The agreement is multi-faceted, serving both as an
assignment of an interest in the loan and as a statement of the duties of each
party. 8
The participation is different from other types of multibank credit ar-
rangements in that it involves two independent, bilateral relationships. 9 The
parties active in the underlying loan transaction are the lead lender and the
borrower. '0 While the participant acquires an interest in the loan, the lead
bank retains record title to the loan documents, the right to deal with the
borrower, and the right to enforce documents. I I In the event of default,
either by the borrower or lead bank, the participant can look solely to the
lead bank for satisfaction of its claims. 12 Since the participant is not a credi-
tor of the borrower, the participant cannot enforce loan documents against
the borrower. 13
Banks use the participation arrangement for numerous reasons. First, a
bank may use a participation arrangement in order to avoid violation of stat-
utory lending limits. 14 Regulatory statutes limit the loan outstanding from a
particular bank to any one borrower.15 Second, a bank may wish to mini-
6. Ledwidge, Loan Participations Among Commercial Banks, 51 TENN. L. REV. 519, 520
(1984) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (5th ed. 1979)).
7. Id. at 520-21.
8. Id.
9. P. Reagan, Participations, Meeting of the Banking Law Institute and the Bank Lend-
ing Institute 1 (Apr. 25, 1988) (available through Executive Enterprises, Inc.).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1984); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
13. Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1407; In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790, 792
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
14. Ledwidge, supra note 6, at 521; Norton & Rogers, Loan Participation Arrangements,
in 2 SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, 4TH ANNUAL INST. ON COMMER-
CIAL LENDING 1 (1988).
15. 12 U.S.C.A. § 84(a) (West Supp. 1988), establishing lending limits for national banks,
provides:
(1) The total loans and extensions of credit by a national banking associa-
tion to a person outstanding at one time and not fully secured, as determined in
a manner consistent with paragraph (2) of this subsection, by collateral having a
market value at least equal to the amount of the loan or extension of credit shall
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mize credit risk by spreading the loan among two or more lenders.1 6 Third,
a bank might desire to foster correspondent lending arrangements. 
7
Fourth, a bank might utilize the arrangement to improve the lead lender's
liquidity and increase capital as a percentage of total assets.18 Fifth, a bor-
rower may wish to maintain relationships with several banks and thus de-
mand that each of those be allowed to share in its loan. 19 Finally, a
participating bank may find the arrangement appealing since it may be able
to lend funds at better terms than it might realize through its own marketing
efforts and, therefore, realize a greater yield.20 At one point commentators
suggested banks preferred participation agreements over other multibank
lending arrangements because of the relative ease in negotiating the partici-
pation. 21 This rationale for using participations, however, is now specious
given the increasing number of problems and corresponding litigation arising
from the use of participation agreements.
22
Participation agreements vary from loan to loan, yet the typical participa-
tion can be described as follows. A lead lender, the bank that originated the
loan, will sell a participation, or percentage of the loan, to one or more other
banks, called participating lenders. This sale normally occurs at the time the
loan is closed;23 however, numerous banks are now entering the arrange-
ment subsequent to closing in efforts to solve undercapitalization
problems.24 The lead lender normally retains a percentage interest of the
entire loan, selling only a portion of the loan to a participating bank.25 In-
frequently, the lead bank arranges for the participating bank to purchase
100% of the loan. 26 The lead lender usually keeps the loan documents in its
not exceed 15 per centum of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus of
the association.
(2) The total loans and extensions of credit by a national banking associa-
tion to a person outstanding at one time and fully secured by readily marketable
collateral having a market value, as determined by reliable and continuously
available price quotations, at least equal to the amount of the funds outstanding
shall not exceed 10 per centum of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired sur-
plus of the association. This limitation shall be separate from and in addition to
the limitation contained in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
Id.
16. Norton & Rogers, supra note 14, at i.
17. Id.; Ledwidge, supra note 6, at 522.
18. Norton & Rogers, supra note 14, at 1.
19. Id.; Ledwidge, supra note 6, at 522.
20. Ledwidge, supra note 6, at 522.
21. Id.
22. Examples of these problems include: continued dispute over the classification of the
arrangement, as discussed infra in text accompanying notes 40-117; the borrower's right to
offset, as discussed infra in text accompanying notes 176-96; the purchasing bank's duty to
conduct further credit analysis of both the borrower and the selling bank; and a corresponding
increase in risk to the buying bank, which faces not only the borrower's default, but also the
selling bank's insolvency.
23. Norton & Rogers, supra note 14, at 2.
24. E.g., Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F. Supp. 799, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).




name, retains the loan documents in its files, and manages the loan. 27
The loan participation agreement itself should set forth in detail the ar-
rangement between the lead and the participant. This enumeration includes,
but is not limited to, specifying (1) that the transaction is a purchase of a
certain percentage of the loan by the participant, (2) the terms of the
purchase, (3) the rights and duties of all parties, (4) the method of holding
and disbursing funds received from the borrower, (5) the information to be
given to the participant, (6) the relationship of the loan and/or collateral in
the participated loan to other loans made to the borrower, and (7) other
language addressing matters such as setoff, notices, procedures for exercising
remedies and in the event of insolvency by any party, and clarification that
the lead/participant relationship is that of seller/purchaser as opposed to
debtor/creditor. 28 Furthermore, in addition to executing the participation
agreement, the lead lender often issues participation certificates to the par-
ticipant, evidencing the amount and percentage of the loan purchased. 29 Ex-
clusive use of participation certificates without a companion participation
agreement raises many legal concerns and does not demonstrate sound busi-
ness judgment. 30
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE LEAD/PARTICIPANT RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between the lead bank and the participanting bank is an
area that has received extensive treatment, 3 1 yet continues to be plagued
with uncertainty and controversy. The terms of the agreement govern the
relationship;3 2 however, when the agreement is ambiguous or lacking in de-
tail, the court must look beyond the agreement to all facts, circumstances,
and appropriate case law.33 Accordingly, a court confronting the characteri-
zation issue must scrutinize the agreement to determine if it creates a bona
fide participation, a true sale, or merely a disguised loan. 34 The banks' rela-
tionship is of particular importance when the lead bank becomes insolvent,
27. Id. at 3. Managing the loan includes servicing the loan and handling all dealings with
the borrower. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. For examples of arrangements utilizing participation certificates, see Franklin v.
Commissioner, 683 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1982); Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp.
1340, 1342 (W.D. Okla. 1985); InterFirst Bank Abilene v. FDIC, 590 F. Supp. 1196, 1198
(W.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd, 777 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Columbia Pacific Mort-
gage, 20 Bankr. 259, 261 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1981).
30. See Norton & Rogers, supra note 14, at 3 (exclusive use of participation certificates is
"legally and businesswise foolhardy for any of the parties").
31. See generally Hutchins, What Exactly Is a Loan Participation?, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 447,
458-84 (1978) (providing extensive review of lead/participant relationship); Ledwidge, supra
note 6, at 523-28 (discussing relationship between selling bank and purchasing bank); Note,
Classification of Loan Participants Following the Insolvency of a Lead Bank, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1115, 1126-33 (1984) (revisiting classification dispute).
32. Franklin, 683 F.2d at 128; Colorado State Bank v. FDIC, 671 F. Supp. 706, 707 (D.
Colo. 1987).
33. For a discussion and demonstration of the court's reliance on the banks' intent when





since the participant's classification determines whether it is entitled to a
preferred creditor status or, instead, is relegated to a general unsecured cred-
itor status.35
In characterizing the arrangement, the court will choose one of two broad
categories. 36 One line of authority considers the purchase of part or all of a
lead bank's loan to a third party as a loan from the participant to the lead.3 7
A second line of authority describes the participant's act of purchasing part
or all of the lead bank's loan as a purchase of an undivided property interest
in the third-party loan. 38 If the transaction is characterized as a purchase,
the transaction may fall within numerous subcategories. 39 The following
sections will look more closely at each of these relationships.
A. Debtor/Creditor Relationship
The line of authority holding that the participant's act of purchasing the
lead bank's third-party loan is in reality a loan to the lead bank emphasizes
the degree of control, the relative rate of return, and the risk that the lead
bank retains.4° Looking at the control factor, the court focuses on the de-
gree of control lead banks retain over the third-party loan. In most partici-
pations, the lead retains the loan documents, manages the loan, and does not
notify the borrower of the change in the relationship.41 When analyzing the
rate of return, the court focuses on whether the lead bank unwarrantedly
earns less than the participating bank on the third-party loan. Under the
risk factor, the court focuses on the amount of risk the lead bank retains in
relation to the amount of risk the participating bank assumes.42
In re Alda involved a participation agreement that purportedly created a
joint venture between the lead bank and the participants. 43 The court deter-
mined that the arrangement lacked one of the requisite elements of joint
ventures: joint control."4 The court reached this conclusion after consider-
ing that the participant played no part in deciding to make the loan, the
35. See Note, supra note 31, at 1126.
36. Id. at 1122.
37. Id.; see, e.g., Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1408 (10th Cir. 1984)
(participation agreement did not transfer ownership); In re S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc., 32 Bankr.
279, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (agreement providing participant with lesser degree of risk
and higher rate of return than lead created loan); In re Alda Commercial Corp., 327 F. Supp.
1315, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (participation agreement created a lender/borrower relationship).
38. See, e.g., Franklin v. Commissioner, 683 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1982) (participation
certificates indicated transaction was sale); Stratford Fin. Corp. v. Finex Corp., 367 F.2d 569,
571 (2d Cir. 1966) (overall fact situation supported finding that parties intended purchase
transaction); Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F. Supp. 799, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (banks intended
participation arrangement to be sale).
39. See infra notes 55-117 and accompanying text.
40. In re Alda, 327 F. Supp. at 1317.
41. Id.; see also Stahl, Loan Participation: Lead Insolvency and Participants' Rights (part
1), 94 BANKING L.J. 882, 883-84 (1977) (typical participation arrangement will include lead
bank retaining all documentation, managing loan, and not informing borrower of change in
ownership).
42. In re S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc., 32 Bankr. 279, 282-83 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983).




participant had no responsibility for managing the account or for handling
collections, and the lead bank did not segregate the monies nor did the par-
ties intend for such.45 Furthermore, the court concluded that no basis ex-
isted for the assertion that a trust or agency had been created.46 Instead, the
court found the relationship was that of lender and borrower, despite the
agreement granting the participants "an undivided fractional" interest.47
Courts may transform a participation from a "true participation" to a
lender/borrower transaction when the participant receives a greater rate of
return than the lead. 48 One court noted that structuring a participation
transaction in a manner that calls for the participant to receive a preferential
return is contrary to the notion of participation, and instead resembles a
debtor/creditor relationship. 49
A final factor considered when determining if a participation agreement
constitutes either a sale or a loan focuses on the amount of risk the partici-
pant assumes. The participant usually assumes the same level of risk that
the party selling the participation has under the loan, each party bearing
100% of the risk related to the portion it owns.50 A problem arises when the
lead lender agrees to repurchase all or part of the loan under given circum-
stances, or provides for other recourse arrangements. Such practices create
an extension of credit by the participant to the lead bank. 51 The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) suggests that any repurchase or re-
course agreement between the lead and the participant be reflected in the
books of both parties, 52 and that such loans be included in the lead bank's
outstanding loan balances when determining its compliance with the lending
limits for national banks.53 To be excluded from the lead bank's lending
limit, the participation must effect a proportionate distribution of credit risk
according to the respective interests of the originating and participating
45. Id. at 1317-18.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1316-17. One commentator has suggested that even though the relationship
may not have risen to the level of a joint venture, the relationship was not one of lender and
borrower, "but one of partial assignee and partial assignor." Hutchins, supra note 31, at 461.
Accordingly, the participant should have been entitled to preferential interest in the accounts
receivable securing the loans without filing a financing statement. Id.
48. See Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F. Supp. 799, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing attrib-
utes that transform participation into loan); see also In re S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc., 32 Bankr.
279, 282-83 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (participations were in reality loans, given participant
received greater rate of return than lead, and participant ran no real risk given lead guaranteed
return of participant's investment).
49. In re S.O.A. W., 32 Bankr. at 282.
50. Id.
51. See Comptroller of Currency, Banking Circular No. 181 (rev. Aug. 2, 1984), replacing
Banking Circular No. 181 (Dec. 8, 1983), 5 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 60,799, at
38,859-2.
52. Id. Circumstances often giving rise to repurchase of the loan by the originating bank
include default by borrower or lead bank. For further discussion see 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.104,
32.107 (1988), both clarifying that loans sold on recourse basis are subject to lending limita-
tions imposed by 12 U.S.C. § 84 to the extent of the total amount the seller may ultimately
have to repurchase. The bank does not need to include the amount of the loan sold on a
nonrecourse basis in calculating the bank's compliance with lending limits. Id.





A true participation agreement has been characterized as (1) an assign-
ment, (2) a tenancy-in-common, (3) a joint venture, (4) an agency, and (5) a
trust.55 The relationship is governed by the terms of the agreement, 56 but if
the terms are unclear, the court must look beyond the agreement to the in-
tent of the parties as inferred from all circumstances.5 7 This section outlines
the analysis of the courts in ascertaining the appropriate characterization of
a participation arrangement classified as a bona fide participation.
1. Assignment
Under the assignment analysis, the lead bank assigns an undivided owner-
ship interest in the underlying loan to the participant. The lead bank then
becomes the participant's agent, servicing the entire loan. This relationship
exists when the language in the agreement provides that the participant is
"purchasing" an "undivided interest" or a "fractional interest" in the loan.5 8
The United States Supreme Court confronted the problem of defining the
participant's interest in Small Business Administration v. McClellan.59 In
determining if the Small Business Administration (SBA) had preferential
rights when it joined in a loan, the Court held that the SBA had "beneficial
ownership" of seventy-five percent of the debt. 60 One commentator inter-
preted this holding to mean that the lead bank actually conveys a partial
assignment of ownership in the loan under a participation agreement. 61
2. Tenancy in Common
Participants may be classified as tenants in common or cotenants with the
lead if the participation agreement provides for a purchase of an "undivided
interest."'62 This classification is premised on basic property principles that
tenants in common own an undivided interest in the property held concur-
rently. 63 This classification is most important in a mortgage loan transaction
after foreclosure. 64 In the event the participant and lead have a disagree-
ment regarding the management of the foreclosed property, the participant
54. 12 C.F.R. § 32.107 (1988).
55. Franklin v. Commissioner, 683 F.2d 125, 128 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 128; Colorado State Bank v. FDIC, 671 F. Supp. 706, 707 (D. Colo. 1987).
57. Stratford Fin. Corp. v. Finex Corp., 367 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Continen-
tal Resources Corp., 43 Bankr. 658, 661 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984).
58. Hutchins, supra note 31, at 463.
59. 364 U.S. 446, 448-53 (1960). McClellan concerned a loan in which the Small Business
Administration participated in 75% of the loan, and the borrower later became bankrupt.
60. Id. at 450.
61. Hutchins, supra note 31, at 464.





could conceivably sue for partition. 65
3. Joint Venture
The court may construe the relationship between the lead and the partici-
pant as a joint venture. 66 The consequences of such analysis include (1) im-
plication of a fiduciary relationship and a corresponding higher standard of
care; (2) implication of an agreement to share losses as well as profits; and
(3) in some jurisdictions, implication of an agency power in the joint ven-
turer, enabling him to obligate his co-venturers. 67 A joint venture typically
has certain characteristics. These characteristics include each party contrib-
uting assets to the venture and holding a joint interest in the undertaking. 68
Additionally, all parties to the venture anticipate a profit and the right to
share in such profit. In the event the venture operates at a loss, however, the
parties will share the losses. 69 The remaining indications of a joint venture
are a limited undertaking, for example, a single loan, and joint control of the
loan. 70
When defining the relationship, the court scrutinizes the agreement and
circumstances very closely before holding a joint venture exists. 71 Thus, a
court denied a claim contending that the participation arrangement was a
joint venture on the basis that the participant had no share in the profits of
the purported joint venturer (the lead), had no role in the initial decision to
make the loan, and did not manage the loan or have any input as to security
or collections. 72 The above claim illustrates the most difficult hurdles to
overcome before a court will find a joint venture. First, the lead often under-
takes the loan independently and does not bring in a participant until a later
date. 73 Therefore, the contribution to a common undertaking is lacking.
Second, since the participant rarely is involved with the day-to-day manage-
ment of the loan, the requisite mutual management does not exist.74
4. Agency
The basis of the agency analysis is that the lead bank retains the loan
documentation after an assignment of a property interest, and concomitantly
collects and distributes loan payments as an agent. 75 The court usually relies
65. Id. This is an equitable right available to tenants in common, which the courts deny if
thought to be unduly prejudicial.
66. Id. at 469.
67. Id. at 470.
68. Id. at 469. Assets commonly contributed include "money, property, effort, knowl-
edge, [or] skill." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See In re Alda Commercial Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1315, 1317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
72. Id. at 1317 (participant agreed to be joint venturer with financing corporation and
sought declaration that it had interest in property of corporation after its bankruptcy to the
extent of money paid to bankrupt pursuant to participation agreement). See supra notes 44-47
and accompanying text.
73. Hutchins, supra note 31, at 469.
74. Id.
75. Note, supra note 31, at 1122.
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on specific facts in finding an agency relationship, 76 and the consequences
may not always be clear. Some courts have concluded that participation
certificates create an assignment coupled with an agency even though the
lead does not transfer any ownership rights.77 Apparently, this finding turns
on the fact that the lead retains virtually all control with minimal accounta-
bility to the participant. 78 Under this scenario, after the lead bank fails and
the FDIC takes over as receiver, it is permitted to offset the borrower's de-
posit accounts at the lead bank against the balance due on the loans, includ-
ing debts that have participating interests. 79
5. Trust
A final line of cases construes the arrangement as the creation of a trust
for the benefit of the participant.80 After the court makes the initial determi-
nation that the lead bank sold an interest in the underlying debt to the par-
ticipant, the court must then determine whether the parties intended to
create a trust.81 Such a finding imposes an obligation on the lead bank to
hold the participant's share of the proceeds in trust.82 The participant will
find that a trust relationship between the lead and the participant is ex-
tremely beneficial for two reasons. First, as a fiduciary the lead must meet a
higher degree of care in handling the loan.8 3 Second, in the event the lead is
declared insolvent, the participant maintains its status as beneficiary of the
trust.84 Therefore, the lead bank must hold any collections received in trust
for the participant, giving the participant a preferred claim. 85
Courts have historically employed a three-part test when determining
76. Hutchins, supra note 31, at 472.
77. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (10th Cir. 1984); Northern
Trust Co. v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1340, 1341-42 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
78. Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1408; Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp. at 1342.
79. The FDIC as receiver is granted the authority to offset in 12 U.S.C. § 1822(d) (1982).
The FDIC as receiver:
[M]ay withhold payment of such portion of the insured deposit of any depositor
in a closed bank as may be required to provide for . . . any liability of such
depositor to the closed bank or its receiver, which is not offset against a claim
due from such bank, pending the determination and payment of such liability by
such depositor ....
Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp. at 1342 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1822(d)); e.g., Hibernia, 733 F.2d
at 1407-08 (participation agreement amounts to assignment with agency, and does not convey
ownership rights; accordingly, borrower has right to offset, and the setoff extends to partici-
pated loans); Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp. at 1341-42 (participation certificates create assign-
ment coupled with agency and do not create ownership rights, and thus setoff not precluded).
80. Hutchins, supra note 31, at 472.
81. Weiner, Rights of a Participant Bank Against a Lead Bank in a Participation Loan
Agreement, 104 BANKING L.J. 529, 531 (1987).
82. Id.
83. Hutchins, supra note 31, at 472.
84. Id.
85. Id. The court noted in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D.
Okla. 1985), that preferred claims versus general creditor claims are not common. Id. at 1360.
The participant has a heavy burden to establish his preferred claim status, which includes




whether the arrangement rises to the level of a trust.8 6 First, do the circum-
stances indicate the parties intended to create a trust?8 7 Second, have the
lead bank's funds been augmented by the trust monies?8 8 Third, can the
trust be traced into the hands of the receiver? 9
When ascertaining the parties' intent, the court looks first to the specific
agreement to determine if the terms clearly set forth the relationship. 90 Ap-
parently, thoughts diverge as to when the agreement is unclear, thus necessi-
tating a look beyond the agreement. 9 1 In Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC92 the
participant claimed that both parties to the transaction intended to create a
trust even though the participation certificates lacked language to that ef-
fect. 93 The court focused on the language indicating the lead retained con-
trol and owed the participant nothing more than the same care it exercised
in nonparticipated loans.94 Based on that language, the court held the certif-
icates clearly indicated the parties intent to create an assignment and agency,
and therefore it found no need to look beyond the language. 95 The court
reached this conclusion despite further language that the lead would hold for
the participant its pro rata share of loan payments. 96 The court relied on the
rationale that banks normally do not stand in a fiduciary relation to each
other.97 A participant in an arm's-length commercial transaction should
conduct independent credit analysis of loans considered for participation.98
In a second line of cases the courts are not so quick to find the agreement
dispositive of the matter, and instead look beyond the agreement to all facts
and circumstances. 99 In Savings Bank v. FDIC 00 the court confronted the
issue of whether the participation arrangement at bar was a loan or sale. 101
86. See John L. Walker Co. v. Alden, 6 F. Supp. 262, 264-66 (E.D. Il1. 1934).
87. See id. at 264.
88. See id. at 265.
89. Id. at 265-66.
90. Stratford Fin. Corp. v. Finex Corp., 367 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1966) (construing 1Scorr, TRUSTS § 12.2 (2d ed. 1965)); Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1340, 1345
(W.D. Okla. 1985).
91. Compare Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (W.D. Okla. 1985)
(terms of agreement clearly created assignment and agency despite language that lead would
hold payments for participant) with Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (purchase/sale language conflicted with language stating participant would receive
greater return and bear no risk of loss; therefore, must look to parties' intent).
92. 619 F. Supp. 1340 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
93. Id. at 1341.
94. Id. at 1345.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1342.
97. Id. at 1344.
98. Id.
99. E.g., In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 486 F.2d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1973) (court found
trust despite failure to expressly designate relationship as one of trust on basis of conduct of
parties); Stratford Fin. Corp. v. Finex Corp., 367 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1966) (court found
trust relationship based on intent of parties as indicated in agreement guaranteeing repayment
to participant, a term that usually denotes loan instead of purchase); Savings Bank v. FDIC,
668 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court exercised its equitable powers and found
purchase and then trust relationship on basis of parties' intent despite language that partici-
pant had no risk and received higher rate of return than lead).
100. 668 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
101. Id. at 804.
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The agreement stated the transaction was a purchase/sale, but also stated
the participant had no risk of loss and would receive a higher rate of return
than the lead. Under these facts the court would normally find the relation-
ship a mere loan disguised as a participation. 10 2 The court found instead,
however, that the parties intended the transaction to be a purchase/sale and,
moreover, that the parties intended the lead to hold the proceeds of the loans
in trust for the participant. 10 3
Turning to the second prong of the test, the assets at the lead bank must
be "augmented" in an amount equal to the reduction of the loan balance. 104
Augmentation is not established by bookkeeping transactions or an in-
trabank transfer. 0 5 Instead, the lead bank's assets must be increased
through the receipt of monies from outside the bank.'0 6
Under the final requisite factor, the participating bank must be able to
trace the funds to the trust. 10 7 Courts have utilized two tests to determine if
the participating bank meets this factor. 10 8 First, some courts find that the
commingling of the trust funds with the lead's general funds destroys the
separate character and trust traceability requirement, thus defeating the
trust claim. 10 9 Other courts disregard the fact that the lead commingled the
monies with other income for any given period of time. 110 The courts follow
the rationale that if the bank's remaining assets in the hands of the receiver
are sufficient to cover the trust monies, a presumption exists that the lead
bank spent its money first, keeping the trust separate, and therefore, meeting
the traceability element."' In adopting the latter view, the courts eviscerate
102. Id. at 806.
103. Id. A couple of external factors in Savings Bank are worth noting. First, the FDIC
characterizes similar transactions it enters into as purchases/sales. Second, the parties sought
and initially received a ruling by the FDIC characterizing the transaction as a purchase/sale.
The FDIC changed its position, after the OCC declared the lead insolvent, and characterized
the transaction as a loan. Id. at 808.
104. Note, supra note 31, at 1127-28.
105. FDIC v. Mademoiselle of Cal., 379 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1967).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Mademoiselle, 379 F.2d at 665 (participant must be able to identify fund in
the hands of receiver); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 554 F. Supp. 251, 254 (W.D.
Okla. 1983) (participant must show "traceable res upon which a constructive trust can be
imposed"); John L. Walker Co. v. Alden, 6 F. Supp. 262, 265 (E.D. Ill. 1934) (claimant must
show receiver holds account that includes the claimant's deposit) (quoting Fiman v. South
Dakota, 29 F.2d 776. 780 (8th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 841 (1929)).
108. Compare Stratford Fin. Corp. v. Finex Corp., 367 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1966) (find-
ing a trust relationship despite commingling of funds) and Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F.
Supp. 799, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding commingling of funds not "fatal" to trust claim) with
Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1408 (10th Cir. 1984) (requiring the participant
to "identify a specific fund") and Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1351, 1360
(W.D. Okla. 1985) (stating participant must point to an identifiable res).
109. See, e.g., Stratford Fin. Corp. v. Finex, 367 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1966) (recognized
trust only after discussing brevity of commingling and parties' intent to keep funds separate);
Keyes v. Paducah & I.R. Co., 61 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1932) (trust fund not established since
claimant could not point to special deposit fund); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v.
FDIC, No. 85-39 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (funds did not create trust since they were not segregated).
110. Savings Bank, 668 F. Supp. at 807.
111. John L. Walker Co. v. Alden, 6 F. Supp. 262, 265 (E.D. I11. 1934). See generally
Note, supra note 31, at 1126-29 (discussing the application of the three-part test).
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the traceability prong for all practical purposes.' 12
One commentator criticizes this three-prong analysis as too simplistic for
the increasingly complex loan participations of today. 13 In John L. Walker
Co. v. Alden 114 the court discussed for the first time the three-prong test in
relation to the assertion of preferred claims against a failed bank's assets., 15
The court noted the hesitancy with which the legislature viewed recoveries
against the receiver and therefore applied the strict trust test." 6 Alden dealt
not with a participation arrangement though, but with bond proceeds re-
tained by the bank until the contractor met the conditions of his contract.
The Alden court did not intend the test for determining the existence of a
trust to be carried over to the numerous situations in which it is utilized
today. "17
III. LEAD BANK FAILURE
A. The Role of the FDIC
Whenever the Comptroller of Currency declares a national bank insol-
vent, 1" 8 it must appoint the FDIC as receiver. 1 9 The FDIC as receiver
stands in the position of the failed bank and must marshal the assets of the
bank for both its creditors and shareholders. The FDIC must wind up the
affairs of the closed bank according to the respective law addressing the liq-
uidation of closed national banks. 2 0 The FDIC can take one of three possi-
ble routes to effectuate the liquidation process. First, the FDIC can carry
out the liquidation process by allowing the bank to be closed through a
straight liquidation with a deposit insurance payout. 121 Second, the FDIC
may choose to set up the Deposit Insurance National Bank, which assumes
the insured deposits of the failed bank and performs other functions includ-
ing accepting new deposits.122 Third, the FDIC can arrange a purchase and
assumption transaction.123 A purchase and assumption transaction involves
the FDIC as receiver, the FDIC in its corporate capacity, and a healthy
bank purchasing the assets of the failing bank. 124
Today the FDIC most commonly uses the purchase and assumption
transaction. 12 5 The FDIC can effectively use the purchase and assumption
112. Note, supra note 31, at 1132.
113. Id. at 1131-33.
114. 6 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Il. 1934).
115. Id. at 264-67.
116. Id. at 267.
117. Note, supra note 3 1, at 113 1.
118. A bank is insolvent when it can no longer meet the demands of its depositors. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1982).
119. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c) (West Supp. 1988).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1982).
121. Id. § 1821(f).
122. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(h), (i) (West Supp. 1988).
123. Id. § 1823(c).
124. Note, Creditors'Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a Failed National Bank, 64
TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (1986).
125. The other two alternatives to the FDIC are rarely used due to several disadvantages,
including the requirement of a large outlay of cash either for operating expenses or direct
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alternative as a tool to deny payment of certain claims.126 In a purchase and
assumption transaction, the FDIC in its receiver capacity arranges for a
healthy bank to purchase the assets and assume certain liabilities, including
deposits of the failed bank, without interrupting bank services. 127 The
purchasing bank usually purchases all performing assets, leaving the
nonperforming assets with the FDIC as receiver. 128 The bank normally as-
sumes greater liabilities than assets; therefore, the FDIC will pay the assum-
ing bank cash to balance the equation. 129 The FDIC as receiver sells the
assets that the assuming bank does not purchase, such as nonperforming
loans, to the FDIC in its corporate capacity.' 30 The money paid to the
FDIC as receiver is equivalent to the cash paid to the assuming bank in
order to equalize the assets and liabilities.131
The corporate FDIC has priority to the claims of the receivership and
thus attempts to collect those nonperforming assets it purchased to supplant
the monies paid the purchasing bank out of the insurance fund. 132 In the
rare event the corporate FDIC recovers excess proceeds, they are returned
to the FDIC receiver for the benefit of the general creditors. 33
Through the purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC as receiver
transfers all assets either to the assuming bank or to the corporate FDIC.
Claimants of the failed bank can look only to the receiver, which has effec-
tively depleted all assets of the bank. The FDIC frequently answers any
claims brought against it with a sovereign immunity defense. 1 34 In sum, the
FDIC saves money since it pays less for the nonperforming assets than it
would pay under a straight liquidation paying off all depositors to the extent
they are insured, while at the same time, by virtue of its role of "insuring the
nation's banking system," it has special defenses that result in denial of valid
claims against the failed bank.1 35
B. Application to Participation Agreements as Loan Transactions
In the event a court concludes the participation agreement is a loan
cloaked in participation language, the participant becomes a general creditor
payoffs to depositors. Furthermore, the alternatives require interruption in bank services, lack
of depositor access to funds until the depositors prove their claims, and a shaken public confi-
dence. For a general discussion of disadvantages of the various alternatives, see C. Kelly,
FDIC Overview (unpublished paper, also being prepared for Matthew Bender, Bankruptcy).
126. Note, supra note 124, at 1430.
127. Id. at 1432.
128. Portis, FDIC's Powers After a Bank Failure, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 259, 261 (1988).
129. If the assets were greater than the liabilities, the lead would be able to meet its obliga-
tions, and accordingly, this discussion would be inappropriate.




134. See generally Kronberg, Failing Banks: Creditors' Rights and the Distribution of As-
sets, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 325 (1988) (discussing problems bank creditors face after a
purchase and assumption transaction).
135. For an in-depth discussion of the chain of events after a national bank failure, includ-
ing alternatives to the FDIC and the subsequent litigation, see Portis, supra note 128. For
additional discussion, see Note, supra note 124.
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and must engage in the claims process.' 36 All creditors of the failed bank
must present their claims. If the FDIC disaffirms the creditor's claim, the
creditor may challenge it in court and possibly obtain a court order directing
the receiver to pay the claim.137
Under a straight liquidation138 the FDIC issues receivership certificates to
each general creditor holding a valid claim in an amount equal to the credi-
tor's claim, for example the amount of proceeds collected but not distributed
with respect to the participated loan. 139 As the FDIC liquidates the receiv-
ership assets, it distributes liquidation dividends in an amount equal to the
participant's claim in proportion to the total claims. 140 All general creditors
share ratably in distributions from the receivership. 141 The participant suf-
fers a great disadvantage in these circumstances. The participant must prove
its claim, wait for distributions of proceeds, and hope to recover its full
claim, which is extremely doubtful.
If the FDIC chooses the purchase and assumption transaction, it poten-
tially magnifies the participant's problems as a general creditor. The prob-
lem arises if the participant's claim is not assumed in the purchase and
assumption transaction arranged by the FDIC.142 Arguably, the purchase
and assumption transaction amounts to a preferential distribution of bank
assets to those creditors whose claims are assumed.' 43 Whether or not the
participant will be able to recoup its full claim from the FDIC is unclear.
First Empire Bank v. FDIC I" and FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.145
demonstrate diverging thoughts on the issue. 146
In First Empire the FDIC liquidated an insolvent bank through a
purchase and assumption agreement. The purchasing bank did not assume a
number of letter of credit obligations of the insolvent bank. The creditors
whose claims had not been assumed contended that the purchase and as-
sumption transaction was a preferential distribution by the receiver to those
creditors whose obligations were assumed contrary to the FDIC's duty to
make ratable distributions. 147 The court held that the creditors were entitled
136. For a discussion on the claims process, see Note, supra note 124, at 1431-40.
137. Id. at 1433-34; 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1982) (before paying claim, corporation "may
require the final determination of court").
138. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1982).
139. See Note, supra note 124, at 1431-32.
140. Id.
141. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1982).
142. For discussion of the purchase and assumption transaction, see supra notes 125-35.
143. See Kronberg, supra note 134, at 332.
144. 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 91 (1978).
145. 592 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979).
146. For an in-depth analysis of these cases and the impact of the disparity, see Kronberg,
supra note 134.
147. These requirements are set forth in 12 U.S.C. §§ 91, 194 (1982). Section 91 provides
"all payments of money ... made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contem-
plation thereof, made ... with a view to the preference of one creditor to another ... shall be
utterly null and void." Id. § 91. Section 194 adds: "The comptroller shall make a ratable
dividend of the money so paid over to him by such receiver on all such claims as may have




to receive their ratable share given that the following criteria were met:
(1) the insolvent bank's liability was fixed at the date of insolvency, and (2) a
claim was filed in a timely manner against the receiver. 148 The court rea-
soned that equitable payment of all creditors surely is of greater importance
than the fiscal integrity of the deposit insurance fund. 149 To hold otherwise
would leave unassumed creditors with nothing more than a claim against the
undesirable assets of the insolvent bank on which the FDIC as a corporation
has a priority status.150
In Citizens the court reviewed a claim arising from a purchase and as-
sumption transaction. The claimant participated in a loan that the purchas-
ing bank did not purchase in the purchase and assumption transaction. The
FDIC in its receiver capacity transferred the loan to the FDIC in its corpo-
rate capacity. The receivership was left without any assets after the
purchase and assumption transaction, precluding recovery by those creditors
whose obligations were not assumed. The court concluded that while the
FDIC may have breached its duty to distribute the insolvent bank's assets
ratably, the FDIC was immune pursuant to sovereign immunity granted
under the Federal Torts Claim Act.151
These cases illustrate the uncertainty a participant relegated to a general
creditor status faces under different jurisdictions. If the participant is in the
Ninth Circuit and meets the requisite criteria, he should receive a pro rata
share of the failed bank's assets on equal footing with those creditors whose
claims are assumed by the purchasing bank. 1 52 One commentator suggests
that this theory will create certainty regarding which claims the FDIC will
recognize, and accordingly, reduce the amount lead banks must compensate
participants. 153 Thus, the overall cost in banking will decrease. If the par-
ticipant is in the Seventh Circuit, however, his rights as a general creditor
are less certain as the court is likely to hold the FDIC immune from credi-
tors' claims. 154
C. Application to Bona Fide Participation Agreements
In the event the participant demonstrates that it purchased a participation
and therefore holds a beneficial interest in the loan, its collection rights
should be ensured even if the lead is declared insolvent. The participant is a
partial owner of the underlying loan rather than just a lender to the lead
bank. Even the FDIC does not dispute that the participant has an owner-
148. First Empire, 572 F.2d at 1367, 1369.
149. Id. at 1371. The courts closing statement provides "it could not have been congres-
sional intent, upon balance, to have the fiscal integrity of the deposit insurance fund ... out-
weigh the policy of equitable and ratable payment of creditors in this manner and to permit the
FDIC ... to prefer some creditors over others .... " Id.
150. Id.
151. FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 368-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 829 (1979).
152. First Empire, 572 F.2d at 1371.
153. Kronberg, supra note 134, at 327.
154. Citizens Bank, 592 F.2d at 371-73.
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ship interest in the loan if the loan participation is in fact valid. 155 Numer-
ous courts authorize recovery by the participant in preference to the general
pro rata distribution of assets if the court finds the participant owns the
property. 156 Contrary to the rationale behind this line of cases, however,
authority also exists for allowing the FDIC to dilute the participating bank's
interest through several vehicles: (1) finding an agreement unenforceable,1 57
(2) utilizing a future advances clause, 158 and (3) utilizing setoff.159 The fol-
lowing subsections discuss these vehicles. The latter two vehicles are of
equal concern to all participants regardless if they are classified as lenders or
bona fide participants, and thus, the discussion will encompass application to
both classifications.
1. Enforceability of Agreement Against FDIC
Of concern, even to a bona fide participant, is whether the participation
agreement will be effective against the FDIC when it intervenes in the case
of a failed lender. If the FDIC arranges a purchase and assumption transac-
tion and transfers the nonassumed assets and liabilities to the FDIC in its
corporate capacity, the participant cannot enforce a participation agreement
unless the agreement complies with 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e). 160 This sec-
tion provides that an agreement is valid against the FDIC only if (1) the
parties execute the agreement in writing, (2) the parties execute the agree-
ment at the time the lead bank acquires the loan, (3) the board f directors of
the bank approve the agreement, and (4) the agreement is an official bank
155. Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F. Supp. 799, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
156. E.g., FDIC v. Mademoiselle of Cal., 379 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1967) (direct recov-
ery against receiver "is authorized in situations where the facts are such that the court must
say in equity that the property is not that of the bank but that of the claimant") (quoting John
L. Walker Co. v. Alden, 6 F. Supp. 252, 267 (E.D. I11. 1934)); Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F.
Supp. 799, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing participating bank to recover its full 80% interest in
underlying loan's proceeds in preference to general pro rate distribution of receivership assets
after finding parties intended to create trust and a true purchase of undivided interest in under-
lying loan); InterFirst Bank Abilene v. FDIC, 590 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (W.D. Tex. 1984),
aff'd, 777 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986) (when FDIC collected amount due on participated loan, it
acted as agent for InterFirst, given participation was purchase/sale, and thus, funds collected
were not asset of receivership to be distributed among general creditors, but instead belonged
to InterFirst); In re Columbia Pac. Mortgage, 20 Bankr. 259, 263 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1981)
(allowing secondary mortgage participant direct recovery of liquidation proceeds after finding
participant was beneficial owner of undivided interest in underlying loans, and accordingly
seller was holding trust property subject to beneficiary's interest).
157. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982).
158. In re Continental Resources Corp., 43 Bankr. 658, 663-65 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984),
aff'd, 799 F.2d 622 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1986).
159. See, e.g., Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1408 (10th Cir. 1984) (partici-
pation arrangement did not transfer ownership to participant and did not preclude bor-
rower's/depositor's right to offset); FDIC v. Mademoiselle of Cal., 379 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir.
1967) (sale of interest in loan did not impact borrower's/depositor's right to offset); Northern
Trust Co. v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (borrower/depositor has right
to offset even if another bank is participating in loan as long as lead is still creditor and has
responsibility for participated loan); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1351,
1356-57 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (finding that participation transaction created property interest in
participant does not preclude borrower/depositor from offsetting). For a discussion of the
mechanics and ramifications of setoff, see infra section III.C.3.
160. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982).
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record. 16 1 All four statutory requirements must be met before a participant
can succeed against the FDIC when the participant attempts to dilute an
asset of the failed bank.' 62 One of the purposes for the statute is to allow
bank examiners to rely on a bank's records when conducting bank examina-
tions to determine the fiscal soundness of the bank. 16 3 Not surprisingly, the
FDIC refuses to honor oral recourse agreements asserted by the participant
against the failed bank. 16'
Courts thus far have not concerned themselves with the requirement that
the parties execute the agreement contemporaneously with the execution of
the underlying loan. This requirement deserves attention as a growing
number of banks utilize the participation agreement to "window dress," or
to enhance liquidity when the bank is suffering from undercapitalization. 165
Lenders utilizing participations for these purposes frequently enter the
agreement subsequent to the initial funding of the loan.
While the courts have not addressed the situation where the lead lender
and participant do not execute the participation contemporaneously with the
creation of the loan by the lead lender, one commentator suggests the import
of such a situation.' 66 It is unclear why the FDIC is not quick to jump on
this defense as it usually is not timid with its claims. Arguably, the statute is
inapplicable to a bona fide participation interest because the lead bank has
conveyed the asset to the participant; therefore, the lead does not include
that portion of the asset on its books and the FDIC does not include the
asset in its evaluation of the bank. Moreover, on the same line of argument,
in the event the purchasing bank in a purchase and assumption transaction
does not assume the loan, the FDIC would not acquire the participated in-
terest of the loan since it is not an asset of the receivership because the par-
ticipant now owns the asset. No case law exists to support this proposition,
161. 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e) provides as follows:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the
Corporation [(FDIC)] in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as
security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless
such agreement (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank
and the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the
obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank,
(3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan
committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or
committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution,
an official record of the bank.
Id.
162. See Langley v. FDIC, 108 S. Ct. 396, 403, 98 L. Ed. 2d 340, 342 (1987).
163. Id. at 401, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 342. The Court subsequently notes that such reliance is
critical given that the FDIC uses such evaluations in determining if a bank is insolvent and
then determining the best way to proceed, e.g., liquidate or arrange a purchase and assumption
transaction. Id. Since this last evaluation is made "with great speed, usually overnight, in
order to preserve the going concern value of the failed bank and avoid an interruption in
banking services," banking authorities must be able to review the books and determine the
exact nature and terms of all assets. Id.
164. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457-59 (1942).
165. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. FDIC, 668 F. Supp. 799, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (participation
agreement was result of concentrated effort by lead bank's board of directors to sell off part of
existing loan portfolio in attempt to "solve its chronic undercapitalization problems").
166. See Norton & Rogers, supra note 14, at 8.
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however, and it is equally feasible that the FDIC will argue the agreement
does diminish the FDIC's right in the loan/asset it acquires, given the agree-
ment decreases the interest held by the receivership.
2. Future Advances Clause
An obstacle facing both true participants and lending participants arises
when the underlying loan agreement contains future advance language. 167
The case of In re Continental Resources Corp.168 provides an illustration of
the problem. In Continental Resources the debtor (CRC) and Penn Square
Bank, N.A. (PSB) entered a secured revolving credit agreement. CRC
granted PSB a mortgage on all of CRC's oil and gas wells as security. The
mortgage included language indicating the mortgage secured any loans and
advances the mortgagee "makes now or hereafter" and any other obligations
of the mortgagor to the mortgagee. 16 9 PSB subsequently entered a participa-
tion agreement with Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company
of Chicago (CINB), in which CINB became a ninety-five percent participant
in the loan. Later that year, PSB entered a second lending agreement with
CRC.
The Comptroller of Currency later declared PSB insolvent, and appointed
the FDIC receiver. The FDIC alleged that the oil and gas mortgages
granted with the initial funding also secured the second loan. CINB alleged
that PSB had a fiduciary duty to refrain from using the collateral for a sec-
ond loan between the lead bank and the borrower. In addressing this allega-
tion, the court looked to the language in the participation agreement.' 70
Despite conflicting terms regarding whether the lead had to obtain consent
before the release of the collateral, 171 the court found the language disposi-
tive, holding that the application of the collateral to both loans did not de-
167. A future advances clause provides that the collateral pledged will also cover future
advances made by the lender to the borrower and any other debts, obligations, and liabilities
the debtor incurs. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (5th ed. 1979). The purpose of using the
clause is to preclude having to execute extensive documentation each time the lender makes a
future advance to the same borrower. In re Continental Resources Corp., 43 Bankr. 658, 660
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984), aff'd, 799 F.2d 622 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1986).
168. 43 Bankr. 658 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984), aff'd, 799 F.2d 622 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1986).
169. The mortgage included the following clause:
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness ... [a]ll loans and
advances which Mortgagee may hereafter make to Mortgagor, and all other and
additional debts, obligations and liabilities of every kind and character of Mort-
gagor ... together with any and all renewals and extensions of such loans, ad-
vances, debts, obligations and liabilities, or any part thereof, and all interest,
attorney's fees and other changes thereof, or incurred in connection therewith.
43 Bankr. at 660.
170. Id. at 663.
171. The participation agreement and corresponding certificate both contained clauses
dealing with the release of collateral. Id. at 664. The participation agreement provided:
"[W]e will not without your prior written consent exercise any such rights which would ...
release any collateral for the loans .... " Id. The participation certificate provided: "We
reserve the right to release collateral and to permit substitutions of new collateral." Id. Ar-
guably, these two clauses are ambiguous, thus requiring the court to look beyond the agree-
ment. It is unclear, however, whether the court would have reached a different result.
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stroy the participation agreements.' 72 The court found the language in the
agreement to be similar to a case where the court disagreed with the partici-
pant's argument that the participation transferred ownership. 173 It is un-
clear, however, whether ownership language alone would preclude such an
outcome. Unless trust language exists creating a fiduciary duty, 174 the court
will continue to apply the collateral to any advances covered by the future
advance clause, because of the presumption that a commercial financial insti-
tution knows the terms of the loan agreement and the value and security of
its investment.1 75
3. The Problem of Setoff
Both bona fide participants and those classified as lenders are faced with
an additional and increasingly prevalent pitfall, the problem of setoff. The
lead bank makes a loan to a borrower and either contemporaneously or sub-
sequently sells a percentage of the loan to a participating bank. The bor-
rower, either on its own accord or upon the lead bank's suggestion,
maintains deposit accounts at the lead bank. Subsequently, the lead bank is
declared insolvent, and the FDIC steps in as receiver. The FDIC then al-
lows those debtors who have deposit accounts at the bank to offset those
deposits against their indebtedness to the bank, thus reducing their note bal-
ance. One might initially think this benefits both the lead and the partici-
pant since they have realized a reduction in the total debt. The participant,
however, does not fare so well. Instead of receiving its pro rata share of the
loan payment effectuated through the setoff, the participant receives Re-
ceiver's Certificates in an amount equal to its pro rata share of the setoff
proceeds. ' 76
The problem is more clearly illustrated in Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
FDIC,177 one of numerous cases stemming from the Penn Square Bank
(PSB) failure. Chase purchased participations in numerous loans made by
PSB. Sometime thereafter, the Comptroller of Currency declared PSB insol-
vent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. After finding that particular de-
positors also had outstanding debts to PSB, the FDIC proceeded to offset
those funds on deposit against the indebtedness to the bank. This setoff re-
duced the depositors'/borrowers' debt. Instead of paying Chase its pro rata
share of setoffs effectuated against the participated loans, the FDIC indi-
cated that it would give Chase a Receiver's Certificate for its pro rata share
of the amount offset. 178
172. Id. at 664.
173. Id. (discussing Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1408 (10th Cir. 1984)).
174. For a discussion of the trust relationship, see supra notes 80-117 and accompanying
text.
175. Colorado State Bank v. FDIC, 671 F. Supp. 706, 707-08 (D. Colo. 1987); Northern
Trust Co. v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1340, 1344-46 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
176. See generally Comment, Lead Lender Insolvency and the Problem of Setoff, 40 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 391 (1988) (discussing the right of setoff and its effect on participants).
177. 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
178. The court illustrated the mechanics of the transaction as follows: PSB loans
$1,000,000 to Borrower and Borrower has $500,000 on deposit with PSB as of the date of
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The court upheld the FDIC's method of dealing with participating banks
after finding first that the depositor has the equitable right of setoff.179 Fur-
ther, the court focused on the lack of augmentation to the receiver's estate
after the setoff. 80 Instead, since a mere shifting of credits or paper transac-
tion occurred, the participant could not identify a specific fund held by the
receiver that equitably belonged to the participating bank.18' Finally, the
court held that since Chase was not an assignee, it had no property rights in
the participated loans that might entitle it to a preferred claim. 182
The differentiation between a payment made on a loan and a setoff against
the loan was first made in FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California.183 The case
involved a fact situation similar to that in Chase. In Mademoiselle the court
noted that in order for the participant to establish a preferred claim, it must
meet a heavy burden of proof, indicating that the participant fails to meet
this burden unless it clearly identifies the fund. 184 The participant did not
carry its burden because the indebtedness was reduced by setoff instead of by
a specific payment on the note. ' 85 The court reasoned that a setoff does not
establish funds a participant can claim as its own.' 86 Since the setoff is
merely a shifting of credits, no augmentation of the insolvent bank's assets
occurs. 187
These cases illustrate that the depositor/borrower of an insolvent bank
has an equitable right to offset its deposits against its indebtedness. 88 The
depositor/borrower may exercise this right only if it meets certain condi-
tions. First, the funds on deposit are the debtor's property. 18 9 Second, the
funds on deposit are not a special fund and do not have any restrictions on
them. 190 Third, a debt due and owing exists to the bank. '9' Last, a mutual-
ity of indebtedness exists between the bank and depositor. 192 The deposi-
tor/borrower does not lose its right to offset because of participation so long
as the lead bank retains creditor status. 193 Since the nature of the setoff
precludes augmentation of the bank's assets or identification of a specific
PSB's insolvency. Upon insolvency of PSB, the Borrower can offset his $500,000 deposit
against his debt of $1,000,000, thus now owing PSB $500,000. PSB would no longer be liable
to the Borrower for his $500,000. If Chase had a 90% participation, the FDIC would give
Chase a Receiver's Certificate for $450,000, which is 90% of the offset. Id. at 253.
179. Id. at 254.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 256.
183. 379 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1967).
184. Id. at 664-65 (quoting Converse Rubber Co. v. Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank, 12 F.
Supp. 887, 893 (D. Mass. 1935), aff'd, 87 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1936)).
185. Id. at 665.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 554 F. Supp. 251, 254 (W.D. Okla. 1983)
(construing Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 510 (1892)).
189. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. The requirement of mutuality is met if the lead bank and the borrower "each




fund the participant can claim as its own, the courts will relegate the partici-
pant to creditor status of the lead bank. 194 One court has recognized the
impairment of the participant's property rights, but went on to say that the
property rights acquired were merely an expectation, subject to the right to
offset. 195 The borrower and receiver can enforce these rights unless the par-
ticipation agreement provides otherwise. 196
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the various legal issues related
to the participation agreement and to demonstrate the mounting confusion,
disparity, and need for reform in the area. The issues are important to all
who engage in this method of financing, but become even more important in
the context of lead bank failure, an event that has become commonplace in
the 1980s. While the courts have been balancing the equities in favor of the
borrower and the lead bank on a case-by-case basis, instead of establishing
clear principles of law, the courts have created a morass for banks to wade
through in considering the use of participations. To eliminate these
problems the judiciary and legislature must adopt a uniform, sound method
of dealing with these relationships.
The most sensible place to start the reform is with the legal characteriza-
tion of the participation relationship. At least six categories have been pro-
posed in some form or fashion, yet the courts have failed to build a theory of
law surrounding each of these that would enable a party to act with any
certainty. 197 Courts today frequently imply, undeservingly, a presumption
against the participant. 198 Certainly the participant has an obligation to ex-
ercise due diligence in determining the creditworthiness of both the underly-
ing borrower and the lead bank. Once the participant demonstrates such
diligence, however, no reason exists for the participant always to have a posi-
tion behind the borrower and the lead bank, or more precisely the FDIC.
Instead, the courts should presume that a purchase transaction occurred un-
less the substance of the transaction is a loan. The courts should examine
the facts and circumstances to determine if the transaction is a loan when
the participant assumes a lesser degree of risk either by having recourse
against the lead, or by receiving a greater rate of return.
If the transaction is characterized as a purchase, courts should apply the
theory that the participant has acquired a property interest in every aspect
rather than the current practice of only applying the principle when it serves
the government. For example, underlying loan agreements including a fu-
ture advances clause should not impair the participant's interest. The par-
ticipant as the owner of property rights has interests that should not be
194. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554 F. Supp. at 254-57.
195. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 619 F. Supp. at 1358 (" 'ownership interest' acquired.., was
merely [the participant's] share of an expectation ... subject to the borrower's and the bank's
rights of offset").
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 36-117 and accompanying text.
198. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 619 F. Supp. at 1358.
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diluted by the unfair dealings of the lead lender. Instead, when extending
the "purchase" theory through to its logical consequences, the participant
should be given credit for X percent of the loan, the lead should retain Y
percent, and if the lead chooses to make future advances on the same collat-
eral, it can only do so to the extent of its interest. The lead bank should not
be able to dilute the participant's interest contrary to a bona fide participant
being characterized as a partial owner of the underlying loan.
Likewise, the growing number of participants' interests diluted by setoff
should cease. In upholding setoffs the courts have repetitively focused on
what is fair to the borrower and the lead bank, leaving the burden with re-
spect to the market risk of participation ventures on the participant. 99
Courts adopt this theory, viewing it as consistent with the banking policies
published by the Comptroller of the Currency in its guidelines for participa-
tions.2° ° Dilution through setoff, however, is inconsistent with the concept
of purchasing a property interest.
First, no mutuality exists between the underlying borrower and the lead to
the extent of the participant's interest. 20 1 The ownership interest now lies
with the participant, and the lead bank must exclude that portion of the loan
from its outstanding loan balances when determining if the lead is in compli-
ance with statutory lending limits. 20 2 Seemingly, the bank's creditor status
in relation to the borrower has been reduced by the portion of the loan
participated.
Recognizing the judiciary's reluctance to impair the borrower's right to
setoff, especially since the borrower often is unaware of the participation,
this proposal does not deny that right. Instead, this Comment proposes that
the lead hold the setoff proceeds in trust for the participant, just as the lead
does when it receives proceeds by means of a check or other external pay-
ment. An incredible disparity requires the lead as "trustee" to turn funds
over to the participant if it receives them directly from the borrower, but not
if it receives the funds through setoff. The result is the same: a reduction in
the borrower's outstanding loan occurs through application of money be-
longing to it. The interests held by the respective parties have not changed,
nor have the relationships changed. The only thing that has changed is the
lead bank's status, which is more than likely due to its own mismanagement.
Why the judiciary and legislature feel the participant should bear all the
hardship is inexplicable.
Accordingly, this Comment suggests that the judiciary overrule the appli-
cation of the three-prong test, specifically, the requirement of augmenta-
199. Id.
200. Id. (referring to Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular No. 181 (rev. Aug. 2,
1984) replacing Banking Circular No. 181 (Dec. 8, 1983), 5 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
60,799, at 38,859-2).
201. In Seattle Banking the court failed to rule on whether mutuality exists in participated
loans after April 14, 1983, when federal regulations took effect excluding certain participation
loans from the lead bank's lending limits. Id. For a discussion on setoff and the criteria, see
supra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
202. 12 U.S.C.A. § 84(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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tion.20 3 Without this requirement the participant would receive credit for its
pro rata share in all cases in keeping with the underlying structure of the
transaction: the lead bank acting as trustee and/or agent for the participant,
and the participant realizing its interest.
Under this proposal, Congress must institute reforms at the FDIC level,
clarifying the scope of federal deposit insurance coverage. Presently, the
scope of the coverage includes the net deposit due to the depositor, to the
extent it is less than $100,000.204 The term "deposit" includes money or its
equivalent held by the bank.20 5 This includes funds held for escrow, funds
held as security, funds held as advance payments, funds held for letters of
credit, and funds held for withheld taxes.20 6 The term specifically excludes
203. For a full discussion of the requirement of augmentation, see supra notes 104-06, 180-
87 and accompanying text.
204. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(l)(1), (3), (m)(l) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). The scope of the
coverage presently is as follows:
Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term "in-
sured deposit" means the net amount due to any depositor (other than a deposi-
tor referred to in the third sentence of this subsection) for deposits in an insured
bank (after deducting offsets) less any part thereof which is in excess of
$100,000. Such net amount shall be determined according to such regulations
as the Board of Directors may prescribe, and in determining the amount due to
any depositor there shall be added together all deposits in the bank maintained
in the same capacity and the same right for his benefit either in his own name or
in the names of others except trust funds which shall be insured as provided in
subsection (i) of section 1817 of this title.
Id. § 1813(m)(1). The term "deposit" means:
(1) [T]he unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a
bank in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to
give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking,
savings, time, or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of de-
posit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other
similar name, or a check or draft drawn against a deposit account and certified
by the bank, or a letter of credit or a traveler's check on which the bank is
primarily liable: Provided, That, without limiting the generality of the term
"money or its equivalent", any such account or instrument must be regarded as
evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited or issued in
exchange for checks or drafts or for a promissory note upon which the person
obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable, or for
a charge against a deposit account, or in settlement of 6hecks, drafts, or other
instruments forwarded to such bank for collection ....
(3) money received or held by a bank, or the credit given for money or its
equivalent received or held by a bank, in the usual course of business for a spe-
cial or specific purpose, regardless of the legal relationship thereby established,
including without being limited to, escrow funds, funds held as security for an
obligation due to the bank or others (including funds held as dealers reserves) or
for securities loaned by the bank, funds deposited by a debtor to meet maturing
obligations, funds deposited as advance payment on subscriptions to United
States Government Securities, funds held for distribution or purchase of securi-
ties, funds held to meet its acceptances or letters of credit, and withheld taxes:
Provided, That there shall not be included funds which are received by the bank
for immediate application to the reduction of an indebtedness to the receiving
bank, or under condition that the receipt thereof immediately reduces or extin-
guishes such an indebtedness ....
Id. § 1813(l)(1), (3).




money received by the bank to reduce an indebtedness to the bank.20 7
Funds received by the lead through offset would appear to be within the
purview of this last category.
Arguably, when the FDIC as receiver, acting for the lead, offsets the bor-
rower's deposit account against his outstanding debt to both the lead and the
participant, the money being held by the lead has just moved to a different
creditor: the participant. The monies held are analogous to escrow funds,
withheld taxes, and letters of credit. 20 8 The lead is holding money that be-
longs to someone else. It is unclear, however, whether the existing statutory
language includes setoff funds within the definition of deposit. Funds re-
ceived by the lead bank through setoff reduce or extinguish an indebtedness
to the receiving bank and are therefore specifically excluded from the term
deposit. 20 9
This writer suggests that the money received reduces not only a debt to
the receiving bank, but also reduces the participant's respective debt. To the
extent an ambiguity exists under the current statute, however, 12 U.S.C.A.
section 1813(1)(3) should be amended by adding the following definition:
The term "indebtedness to the receiving bank" includes only that
amount of money that the borrower owes to the bank after subtracting
all interests that have been sold, and accordingly, excluded from the
bank's outstanding loan balances for the purpose of determining statu-
tory compliance with regulatory lending limits. 210
The next area this Comment addresses also involves the FDIC, and the
need for guidance regarding when agreements will be enforceable against the
FDIC acting in its corporate capacity. Ostensibly, the government promotes
ambiguity in order to enhance its position against possible litigation. A trou-
bled banking industry, however, cannot continue to operate under such un-
certainties.2 11 Therefore, this writer proposes the legislative clarification of
12 U.S.C. section 1823(e), stipulating whether the lead must execute a par-
ticipation agreement contemporaneously with the loan agreement.
Given the growing number of participations executed subsequent to the
initial loan, this matter is of special importance. No real need exists for
contemporaneous execution of the two agreements; therefore, this Comment
proposes an amendment eliminating this requirement for participation
agreements. This amendment will not be adverse to the underlying purpose
of the section, which is to get an accurate picture of the bank's position. 21 2
A final target for legislative amendment involves the FDIC and its use of
the purchase and assumption transaction. 213 Before discussing proposed
changes, a look at the purpose of the FDIC is warranted. Congress created
the FDIC and its function as receiver to protect both depositors and other
207. Id.
208. In each of these instances the lead is holding monies on someone else's behalf.
209. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(l)(3) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
210. Id.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
212. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 125-35, 142-54 and accompanying text.
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creditors. 21 4 In the wake of mounting bank failures, however, the FDIC has
changed its posture, seeking to preserve the fiscal integrity of the insurance
fund versus protecting creditors, and consequently has expanded potential
defenses available against creditors claims. 215
Claims arising from the purchase and assumption transaction demonstrate
the use of these expanded defenses.2 16 In the event the purchasing bank does
not assume a participant's interest, the participant often alleges that the
FDIC has breached its duty to make a ratable distribution. 21 7 While the
participant may succeed with its claim in some jurisdictions, other jurisdic-
tions quickly recognize an expanded FDIC immunity.2 18 If the FDIC wants
to continue to use the purchase and assumption transaction, Congress must
remedy the discrepancy demonstrated in First Empire Bank v. FDIC219 and
FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. 220 This Comment proposes that the stat-
ute governing purchase and assumption transactions incorporate the test
promulgated in First Empire. Incorporation of the test would be in line with
the underlying purpose of protecting all creditors ratably.2 21 Such legisla-
tion might provide as follows:
In the event the FDIC arranges a purchase and assumption transaction,
it is providing for a distribution of assets and must do so on a ratable
basis. Accordingly, all claims that are provable at the time the closed
bank, or bank in danger of closing, is placed in the hands of the receiver
shall be included in the distribution. A claim is provable
(1) if it exists and is absolute at the time the bank is placed in
receivership;
(2) if it is made in a timely manner.
In the event certain provable claims are not assumed by the purchasing
bank, the FDIC is authorized and obligated to pay dividends on such
claims.
2 2 2
Finally, recognizing that legislative change is not always expeditious, a
model participation agreement follows in the Appendix with suggested lan-
guage that attempts to preclude the unforeseen dangers that often arise after
lead lender failure. Specifically, a participation agreement should include
language reaffirming that the transaction is a sale, with the lead holding
214. Note, supra note 124, at 1429.
215. Kronberg, supra note 134, at 326-27.
216. See generally Kronberg, supra note 134 (discussing problems bank creditors face after
FDIC arranges purchase and assumption transaction and disparity in courts' treatment of
problems).
217. See FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 829 (1979).
218. Compare First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1370-71 (9th Cir.) (FDIC obli-
gated to make ratable distribution of failed bank's assets and use of purchase and assumption
did not accomplish), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 91 (1978), with FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
592 F.2d 364, 372-73 (7th Cir.) (FDIC immune under FTCA regardless of whether it breached
duty to ensure ratable distribution of failed bank's assets), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979).
See also supra text accompanying notes 144-54.
219. 572 F.2d 1361, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1978).
220. 592 F.2d 364, 372-73 (7th Cir. 1978).
221. See Note, supra note 124, at 1458.
222. The writer suggests this provision be included in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) after (4).
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monies from the borrower, received either through direct payment or
through setoff, in trust for the participant; language precluding the use of the
underlying collateral as security for any other obligations; and language ad-
dressing procedures to be followed in the event of insolvency by any party.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems surrounding participation agreements have been mounting
over a period of time, beginning with the classification of the arrangement.
Moreover, the problems reached a climax in the wake of numerous bank
failures. If banks continue to use participation agreements, legislatures and
courts must make reforms at every level.
This Comment sets forth the problems facing participants and methods to
resolve the related disputes. First, the judiciary should remove the augmen-
tation requirement currently precluding the participant from receiving its
pro rata portion of funds received through setoff. Second, the legislature
should clarify that it is unnecessary for a lender to execute a participation
agreement contemporaneously with the loan agreement. Additionally, the
legislature should make a statutory change clarifying the duties of the FDIC
when it arranges a purchase and assumption transaction. Specifically, the
FDIC should have a duty to make a ratable distribution to all creditors,
including those whose claims are not assumed by the purchasing bank. Last,
this Comment offers a sample participation agreement emphasizing language
intended to resolve questions surrounding ownership, future advances, set-





SAMPLE FORM LOAN PARTICIPATION SALE AND TRUST AGREEMENT
2 2 3
THIS LOAN PARTICIPATION SALE AND TRUST AGREEMENT,
herein called "Agreement," is made in the State of Texas between
, herein called "Seller," and , herein called
"Purchaser."
Section 1. Purchase and Sale of Participation
1.1 Seller hereby agrees to sell to Purchaser and Purchaser hereby agrees
to buy from Seller an undivided participating ownership interest in the prin-
cipal amount of the loan (the "Loan") made by Seller to (the
"Borrower"), as evidenced by that certain note (the "Note") dated
, 19-, with an original principal balance of $.
Purchaser purchases an interest in the principal amount of the Loan to the
extent of __% (the "Pro Rata Part"), together with interest thereon at the
per annum interest rate (the "Interest Percentage") of _% with respect to
the Loan. This Agreement shall govern the sale and transfer by Seller to
Purchaser of such participating ownership interest in the Loan, Seller's re-
sponsibilities for servicing the Loan, and all other aspects of this transaction.
Section 2. Purchaser's Obligation to Fund; Method of Funding
2.1 Seller shall notify Purchaser to fund hereunder. On the date of each
advance by Seller under the Loan (and upon demand by Seller, after accept-
ance of this Agreement by Purchaser, with respect to funds already ad-
vanced by Seller under the Loan), Purchaser shall pay to Seller Purchaser's
Pro Rata Part of such advance (or existing balance) in funds available for
immediate use by Seller at its Dallas office by 11:00 a.m. Dallas time on such
date, and, to the extent available, Seller shall be entitled to debit Purchaser's
account or accounts at Seller by an amount equal to such payment obliga-
tion of Purchaser on such date.
2.2 In the event Purchaser fails or refuses to make any payment to Seller as
required in Subsection 2.1 hereof and sufficient funds are not available there-
for in Purchaser's account or accounts at Seller, then Seller shall be entitled
to (a) fund Purchaser's Pro Rata Part of the advance (or continue to fund
the existing balance) which is the subject of such payment and will be enti-
tled to all interest attributable to Purchaser's Pro Rata Part thereof through
the date that Purchaser pays its Pro Rata Part thereof to Seller as required
herein, and (b) offset against Purchaser's Pro Rata Part of all sums received
by Seller under Subsection 4.4 hereof until reimbursed therefore by Pur-
chaser. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as releasing, modify-
ing, or waiving Purchaser's obligation to make payments to Seller as
provided in Subsection 2.1 hereof.
223. This agreement is only a representative form. Any actual agreement should be tai-
lored to existing circumstances, following applicable laws. The writer thanks Jim Wallenstein,
attorney with Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C. and Norton & Rogers, supra note 14, at 15-20, for
providing a source document.
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Section 3. Seller's Representations and Disclaimers
3.1 Seller hereby represents and warrants to Purchaser that as of the date
Purchaser buys its participating interest in the Loan under this Agreement:
(a) The Loan described in Section 1 hereof is a loan owned solely by
Seller, having been made or acquired by it pursuant to and consistent with
applicable law and regulations as from time to time amended.
(b) Seller is authorized to sell such participation interest.
(c) Such participation interest is eligible and shall remain eligible under
applicable laws and regulations and this Agreement for purchase by the
Purchaser.
(d) Seller has in its possession all instruments representing the Loan, in-
cluding, but not limited to, where applicable, notes, appropriate security in-
struments, loan applications, appropriate evidence indicating the Borrower's
receipt of disclosure materials as required by applicable regulations, apprais-
als or certificates of valuation, appropriate signed loan closing statements,
insurance policies in an amount representing coverage at least equal to the
outstanding principal balance of the Loan (together with any accrued and
unpaid interest thereon which has been added to the principal balance), con-
taining a Loss Payee clause in favor of Seller (collectively, the "Loan
Documents").
(e) The Loan is current as to scheduled periodic payments.
(f) To the extent not already available to Purchaser, Seller shall use its
best efforts to provide Purchaser with the information set forth in Subsection
3.1(d) and (e) of this Agreement, promptly after Seller's receipt of Pur-
chaser's written request therefor.
(g) Seller has made no agreement with the Borrower as to its Loan ex-
cept as stated in the Loan Documents.
(h) To Seller's knowledge there are no delinquent tax or assessment liens
or mechanics' liens against the Borrower and/or collateral.
(i) The Loan is not pledged as collateral for any loan or for any other
purpose.
3.2 Except as may otherwise be provided in this Agreement, Seller makes
no warranty or representation regarding (and shall not be responsible to
Purchaser for):
(a) The performance or observance of any of the terms, covenants or
conditions of any of the Loan Documents on the part of the Borrower or any
party other than Seller.
(b) The due execution, legality, validity, enforceability, genuineness, suf-
ficiency, value or collectability of the Loan Documents or the Loan.
(c) Any representation, warranty, document, certificate, report, or state-
ment herein made or furnished under or in connection with any of such
documents.
(d) The adequacy of collateral, if any, for the obligations of the Bor-
rower under the Loan.
(e) The financial condition of the Borrower.
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3.3 Seller shall not have any duty to inspect the property (including books
and records) of the Borrower. Except as may otherwise be provided in this
Agreement, neither Seller nor any of its representatives shall be liable to
Purchaser for any error of judgment or for any action taken or omitted to be
taken by Seller, in good faith, in the administration and collection of the
Loan, except for its own gross negligence and willful misconduct.
3.4 Notwithstanding any provision contained in this Agreement, it is agreed
that the sale by Seller to Purchaser of a participating ownership interest in the
Loan pursuant to this Agreement shall be without recourse as provided in the
applicable Rules and Regulations for Insurance of Accounts.224
3.5 Purchaser represents and warrants:
(a) it has independently reviewed the Loan and all other documents re-
lated thereto in the possession of Seller and requested by Purchaser, and that
there shall be no recourse on, or any liability incurred by, Seller for any
misstatement (whether material or immaterial) or omission (whether negli-
gent or otherwise) of any Person contained in any such documents or
otherwise.
(b) Purchaser has conducted, to the extent it deemed necessary, an in-
dependent investigation of Borrower, including, without limitation, an inves-
tigation relating to the creditworthiness of Borrower, and the risk involved
to Purchaser in the advance of its funds pursuant to the Agreement.
(c) Purchaser has not relied upon Seller for any such investigation or
assessment of risk.
(d) Purchaser does not consider the acquisition of its participation here-
under to constitute the "purchase" or "sale" of a "security" within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
or Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the
Securities Act of the State of Texas, any other applicable securities statute or
law, or any rule or regulation under any of the foregoing (collectively, as
amended, the "Acts").
(e) Purchaser has no expectation that it will derive profits from the ef-
forts of Seller or any third party in respect of the acquisition of Purchaser's
participation hereunder.
(f) This participation constitutes a commercial transaction by Purchaser
with Seller regarding Purchaser's Pro Rata Part of the obligations of Bor-
rower under the Loan and does not represent an "investment" (as the term is
commonly understood) in Seller or Borrower.
(g) Purchaser is engaged in the business of entering into commercial
transactions (including transactions of the nature contemplated herein and
in the Loan), can bear the economic risk related to the purchase of the same,
224. This provision enunciates that the participant has no recourse against the lead if, for
instance, the borrower defaults. The statement adds to the arrangement being classified as a
purchase/sale, and is in accordance with Comptroller of Currency, Banking Circular No. 181
(rev. Aug. 2, 1984) replacing Banking Circular No. 181 (Dec. 8, 1983), 5 FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH) 60,799, at 38,859-2. See also supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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and has had access to all information deemed necessary by it in making its
decision whether or not to purchase the same.
Section 4. Legal and Beneficial Ownership
4.1 No amount paid by Purchaser to purchase any participation in the obli-
gations of Borrower under the Loan shall be considered a loan by Purchaser to
Seller. Seller shall have no obligation to repurchase the participation sold
under this Agreement upon any default by Borrower under any of its obliga-
tions or otherwise.22 5
4.2 Purchaser's participation ownership interest in the Loan subject to this
Agreement shall be effected by the following measures:
(a) The Note for the Loan shall be annotated: "An undivided participat-
ing ownership in this promissory note has been transferred to
as more fully described in the Loan Participation Sale and Trust Agreement
dated , the terms of which are incorporated herein by
reference."226
(b) The Note shall be delivered to , ("Agent"), to hold in
trust as Purchaser's agent to the extent of Purchaser's interest in the Loan,
and as Seller's agent to the extent of Seller's interest in the Loan. Agent's
sole function shall be to hold the Note in escrow until (i) the Note has been
paid in full (in which event Agent shall forward the Note to its maker),
(ii) Seller's exercise of its repurchase option as set forth in Subsection 5.3 of
this Agreement (in which event Agent shall annotate the Note to indicate
the termination of Purchaser's participation ownership interest and the date
of such termination, and forward the Note to Seller), or (iii) the commence-
ment of foreclosure proceedings under the Loan (in which event Agent shall
forward the Note to whichever party is the servicing agent under this Agree-
ment at the time).
(c) Seller shall send to the Borrower written notice, by postage prepaid
US. mail certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, advising the
Borrower that Purchaser has acquired an undivided interest in the Loan and
directing the Borrower to make all payments of principal and interest due
under the Loan (the "Payments") to a special escrow account (the "Escrow
Account") for such Loan.2 2 7
(d) Upon Seller's receipt of any payment under the Loan in which Pur-
chaser participates pursuant to this Agreement, Seller shall promptly deposit
such payment into the Escrow Account and shall promptly forward to Pur-
chaser from the Escrow Account the payment due to Purchaser pursuant to
the terms of this Agreement.
4.3 Seller will continue to hold legal title to the Loan (in trust for Pur-
chaser, to the extent of Purchaser's interest), and Purchaser shall be the
225. Express language reinforces that the arrangement is not a loan by purchaser to seller.
226. Since the participant is unable to perfect its position, due diligence requires some type
of annotation on the note itself reflecting the division of ownership.
227. By providing the loan debtor with notice of the participation arrangement, the partici-
pant eliminates one source of dispute upon lead lender insolvency. While the loan debtor's
knowledge does not necessarily give the participant any legal rights, it enhances the overall
fact situation when determining the parties' intent.
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holder, subject to the terms of this Agreement, of equitable title to Pur-
chaser's share of the loan.
4.4 With respect to Payments, Seller and Purchaser hereby agree to share
proportionately in the proceeds of any Payments. Except as expressly provided
herein to the contrary, Seller shall promptly:
(a) credit to Purchaser's account or accounts at Seller, Participant's Pro
Rata Part of each payment ofprincipal or interest received by Seller under the
Loan. This includes Payments received in kind and Payments received
through the mechanics of setoff in the event the circumstances surrounding the
right to offset arise.
(b) credit the Purchaser's account or accounts at Seller, Purchaser's Pro
Rata Part of all commitment fees received by Seller under the Loan. Except
for the obligation of Seller to account for payments received by it, the sale and
purchase of the participation hereunder shall be without recourse on, or repre-
sentation or warranty by Seller.228
4.5 Without limiting rights to which Purchaser is or may become entitled,
Purchaser shall have no interest, by virtue of this Agreement and Pur-
chaser's rights hereunder, in (a) any present or future loans from, letters of
credit issued by, or leasing or other financing transactions by, Seller to, on
behalf of, or with Borrower (collectively, the "other financings") other than
the credit facilities provided for under the Loan, (b) any present or future
guaranties by or for the account of Borrower which are not contemplated in
the Loan, (c) any present or future setoff exercised by Seller in respect of
such other financings, (d) any present or future property taken as security
for any such other financings, or (e) any property now or hereafter in the
possession or control of Seller which may be or become security for the obli-
gations of Borrower arising under any Loan Document by reason of the gen-
eral description of indebtedness secured or of property contained in any
other agreements, documents, or instruments related to such financings; pro-
vided that, if payments in respect of such guaranties or such property or the
proceeds thereof shall be applied to the obligations of Borrower arising under
the Loan, then Purchaser shall be entitled to share in such application accord-
ing to its Pro Rata Part .229
4.6 Except as provided herein to the contrary, all rights pursuant to the Loan
or otherwise and all collateral (if any) held by Seller to secure payment of the
obligations of Borrower under the Loan shall be so held (and such rights shall
be exercised) for the ratable benefit of Seller and Purchaser (collectively
"Lenders"), with such collateral being applied in reduction of the Loan before
being applied to any other obligations Borrower owes Seller.230
228. The division of any proceeds from the loan debtor pertaining to the participated loan
shall be handled in the manner stated, removing any doubt in the area. This provision further
provides that in the event of lead lender failure and the loan debtor's corresponding setoff, the
participant will still receive its pro rate part of the reduction. See supra notes 176-96 and
accompanying text.
229. This provision reiterates that any reduction to the participated loan shall be shared
proportionately between the lead and the participant.
230. The future advances issue is discussed supra at notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
The language makes clear that all collateral securing the participated loan shall be applied to
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4.7 Seller shall be responsible for maintaining, or requiring the mainte-
nance of, a complete set of books and records, reasonably satisfactory to
Purchaser, as to the Loan. Seller shall retain the physical possession of the
documentation for the Loan (with the exception of the Note), and shall be
responsible for seeing that the title evidence and policies of insurance for the
account of Seller and Purchaser are properly maintained. Seller will keep all
such documents in segregated files appropriately marked to show that a partic-
ipating interest therein has been sold to Purchaser, and all envelopes and files
pertaining to such documents shall be so marked.231
4.8 Upon Purchaser's payment of the purchase price for the participating
ownership interest in the Loan, Purchaser shall immediately become vested, to
the extent of its participating interest, with beneficial ownership of the Loan
and any and all of the documents of every nature in the possession of the
Seller relating to the Loan. Seller thereafter shall hold the Loan and docu-
ments in trust and as nominee for the benefit of Purchaser to the extent of
Purchaser's beneficial interest.232
4.9 Seller shall not represent to any person that Seller owns any portion of
the participation interest sold to Purchaser under this Agreement, and Seller
shall reflect the transaction hereunder on its balance sheet and other finan-
cial statements as a purchase of assets by Purchaser and a sale of assets by
Seller.
4.10 Any beneficial owner of Purchaser's beneficial interest in the Loan or
such owner's representative, shall have the right at any reasonable time dur-
ing the normal business hours to request and have access to and examine any
and all books, records and such documents relating to the Loan in which it
has a participating interest or relating to any of the matters covered by this
Agreement.
Section 5. Servicing, Prepayments, Repurchase Option
5.1 Seller shall be responsible for the execution of all appropriate notices
and all other acts necessary to perfect title in Purchaser as to the ownership
of Purchaser's participation interest in the Loan, for preserving all rights in
the Loan and administering it in all respects consistent with applicable legal
requirements and regulations, for servicing the Loan in a manner consistent
with good lending practice, and for promptly delivering to Purchaser copies
of all notices and other correspondence with the Borrower. It is agreed that
Seller and Purchaser are not partners or joint venturers, and that Seller is
not to act as agent for Purchaser, but is to act in all Loan administration
matters for Purchaser as an independent contractor and as Purchaser's nom-
inee to hold the participating ownership of the Loan, Loan Documents and
Payments hereunder, and to make the remittances specified in Subsection 4.4
the participated loan first, before application to any other obligations the borrower has to the
lead lender.
231. By providing for separate files and appropriate documentation, the participant is elim-
inating superfluous issues that could arise in the event of lead lender insolvency.
232. This provision reinforces the participant's ownership interest in the loan and sets forth
the relationship between the lead and participant as a trust. Accordingly, the benefits of a trust
relationship, such as a higher duty of care, arise.
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hereof. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to impose any duties
or obligations other than those expressly provided for in this Agreement.
5.2 Seller may perform any of its duties hereunder by or through officers,
directors, employees, attorneys, or agents (collectively "Representatives"),
and Seller and its Representatives shall be entitled to rely, and shall be fully
protected in relying, upon any communication or document believed by it or
them to be genuine and correct and to have been signed or made by the
proper Person and, with respect to legal matters, upon the opinion of coun-
sel selected by Seller. As used herein, the term "Person" means any individ-
ual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, joint venture, trust, other
entity, or Tribunal, and the term "Tribunal" means any state, federal, for-
eign, or other court or governmental department, commission, board, bu-
reau, agency, or instrumentality.
5.3 Seller, at its option, but without obligation to do so, shall have the right
and privilege at any time to pay to Purchaser all principal, interest, and fees
then owing to Purchaser hereunder in respect of its Pro Rata Part, thereby
terminating this Agreement.
5.4 Unless Seller receives prior written approval from Purchaser (which
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed), Seller shall not
enter into or permit any material amendment of, or permit the assignment or
transfer by Borrower of its obligations under, or waive compliance with any
of the material terms of the Loan.
5.5 It is agreed that except as herein set forth, the exclusive right to decide
how the Loan shall be serviced and what to do and how to do it, when to
approve assumptions or similar third party undertakings, when to accelerate
the entire balance due on the Loan for any permissible reason, when to fore-
close, whether or not to obtain a deficiency judgment, and how to administer
foreclosed property, is hereby vested in the Seller, in its reasonable direction,
as nominee for Purchaser. Except as herein provided, Purchaser shall be
permitted to consult with Seller, but shall not be authorized to give direc-
tions to Seller in connection with these matters (except as set forth in Sub-
section 5.6).
5.6 In the event that Seller is unable to collect the Loan after reasonable
efforts to do so, Seller shall be responsible for giving prompt notice thereof to
Purchaser and shall foreclose on the collateral for the Loan. If Seller has not
commenced foreclosure proceedings within six (6) months after an event of
default occurs under the Loan Documents, Purchaser may undertake the
foreclosure in Seller's place and Seller will cooperate fully with Purchaser in
this regard. Any proceeds received from foreclosure sale shall be distributed
in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.
Section 6 Expenses
6.1 Purchaser shall pay its Pro Rata Part of all reasonable Attorneys' fees
and other expenses incurred by Seller (but not vice versa) in connection with
enforcement of the obligations of Borrower under the Loan, and Purchaser
shall be entitled to a Pro Rata Part of any payments subsequently received
by Seller with respect to such fees and expenses.
6.2 Purchaser shall repay to Seller any sums paid to Seller by Borrower
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and distributed by Seller to Purchaser which Seller shall be required to re-
turn to Borrower or to any receiver, trustee, or custodian for Borrower.
Section 7. Increased Participation
7.1 It further is agreed that Seller in its discretion, either directly or
through a servicing agent, may make additional advances on the Loan for
any purpose pursuant to optional future advance clauses in the Loan, as long
as the Loan is in good standing and provided that the resulting unpaid bal-
ance shall not exceed the limitations of applicable loan-to-value or loans to
one borrower regulations or, in any event, 100% of the value of the collat-
eral, and that before making of any such advance, Seller will offer to negoti-
ate with Purchaser regarding the terms of Purchaser's participation in the
transaction including the interest to be paid to Purchaser with respect to
such additional advance, and if agreement is reached, Seller then will make
the additional advance and issue a participation certificate (the "Participa-
tion Certificate") reflecting such additional amount advanced and the inter-
est to be received thereon by Purchaser, and Purchaser then promptly will
pay the agreed cost of its pro rata participation in such additional advance.
If no agreement is reached within ten (10) days of Seller's offer to negotiate
regarding the terms of the transaction, including the interest rate to be paid
to the Purchaser on any such additional advances, Seller may make such
advance for its own account and Purchaser shall not be entitled to partici-
pate therein.
7.2 In the case of every advance, a notation shall be made in the books and
records required under Subsection 4.7 hereof identifying and describing each
advance and Purchaser's participation or non-participation therein, and a
copy thereof shall be furnished to Purchaser.
Section & Servicing Transfer Event
8.1 In the event of the insolvency of Seller, or of the filing by or against
Seller of a petition under any provision of bankruptcy law, or of an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, or the appointment by any public or supervisory
authority of any person in charge of the same or its assets, or a breach by
Seller of any covenant or agreement herein or in any Participation Certificate,
or in the event of the involuntary sale of the Loan or advances, or the issuance
by an appropriate public monitoring or supervisory authority of a cease and
desist order or its equivalent against Seller or its Directors and officers involv-
ing the safety, soundness or financial viability of the Seller, which would have
a material adverse effect on the Loan or Seller's ability to service the Loan,
then in any such event, it is agreed that Purchaser shall automatically succeed
to all rights, titles, status and responsibilities which Seller may have regarding
the holding and servicing of the Loan, and have an option to exercise all of the
powers herein above granted to Seller, and have the option to designate itself or
any person or firm in its discretion to exercise such powers. In such events the
Loan and all records thereof shall be delivered to Purchaser, together with
necessary or proper assignments, transfers and documents of authority.2 33
233. A provision setting forth loan management in the event of lead lender insolvency is




9.1 This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties
hereto, supersedes all prior agreements, if any, relating to the subject matter
hereof, and cannot be modified in any respect except by an agreement in
writing.
9.2 The invalidity of any portion of this Agreement shall in no way affect
the balance thereof; moreover, in this regard, although the parties hereby
reconfirm that this transaction is a sale, they agree that to the extent this
transaction is determined by any court of law as being a loan instead of a sale,
then it is a secured loan, with Seller hereby granting to Purchaser a present
security interest in the Loan pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code 234 (with perfection of such security interest to be perfected by the filing
of UCC-1 Financing Statements in Texas as well as by the possession speci-
fied in Subsection 4.2(b) of this Agreement).
9.3 All headings appearing in this Agreement are for convenience only and
shall be disregarded in construing this Agreement.
9.4 None of the provisions in this Agreement shall inure to the benefit of
Borrower or any Person other than the Lenders; consequently, Borrower
and any Person other than Lenders shall not be entitled to rely upon or raise
as a defense, in any manner whatsoever, the failure of either Lender to com-
ply with the provisions of this Agreement. Neither Lender shall incur liabil-
ity to Borrower or any other Person for any act or omission of the other
Lender.
9.5 Whenever this Agreement requires or permits any consent, approval,
notice request, or demand from one party to another, the consent, approval,
notice, request, or demand must be in writing to be effective and shall be
deemed to have been given when actually received or if mailed, on the third
banking day in Texas after it is enclosed in an envelope addressed to the
party to be notified at the address designated, properly stamped, sealed, and
deposited in the appropriate official postal service.
9.6 Whenever in this Agreement the singular is used, the same shall in-
clude the plural where appropriate, and vice versa; and words of any gender
in this Agreement shall include each other gender where appropriate.
9.7 Purchaser's obligations hereunder are performable in Dallas County,
Texas, and the laws of the State of Texas and of the United States of
America shall govern the rights and duties of the parties hereto and the
validity, construction, enforcement, and interpretation hereof.
9.8 If any legal or equitable action or proceeding is brought by Seller or
Purchaser to enforce or construe a provision of this Agreement, the unsuc-
lead for any of the given reasons. Most importantly, by providing for the transfer of all rights
to the participant upon the lead's insolvency, the parties have in essence eliminated the bor-
rower's setoff right since the requisite mutuality of debt no longer exists. Of course, for a
provision such as this to be upheld, proper notice must be given to the borrower regarding the
participation agreement and the terms thereof.
234. The parties have again set forth the nature of the transaction, but have provided a
safety clause to come into effect in the odd event a court of law does not deem this transaction
to be a sale.
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cessful party in such action or proceeding, whether such action or proceed-
ing is settled or prosecuted to final judgment, shall pay all of the attorneys'
fees and costs incurred by the prevailing party.
9.9 All agreements among the parties hereto, whether now existing or
hereafter arising, are hereby limited so that in no contingency, whether by
reason of demand for payment or acceleration of maturity of the loan under
the Loan and relating to this Agreement or otherwise, shall interest con-
tracted for, charged or received by any bank thereunder or by any partici-
pant exceed the maximum amount permissible under applicable law. If,
from any circumstance whatsoever, interest would otherwise be payable to
any institution in excess of the maximum lawful amount, or such institution
shall ever receive anything of value deemed interest by applicable law in
excess of the maximum lawful amount, an amount equal to any excessive
interest shall be applied to the reduction of the principal of such loan and
not to the payment of interest, or if such excessive interest exceeds the un-
paid balance of principal such excess shall be refunded to the Borrower. All
interest paid or agreed to be paid to any bank or institution shall, to the
extent permitted by applicable law, be amortized, prorated, allocated, and
spread throughout the full period until payment in full of the principal so
that the interest for such full period shall not exceed the maximum amount
permitted by applicable law. This Subsection shall control all agreements
among the parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each party has caused this Agreement to be
signed in its name on its behalf by its proper officials duly authorized.
This day of , 19
SELLER:
BY:
TITLE:
PURCHASER:
BY:
TITLE:
1106 [Vol. 42
